The bureaucratic arms of modern international organizations increasingly consist of staff with ambiguous organizational affiliations. This article analyses implications of this trend from the perspective of the Representative Bureaucracy -using seconded national experts (SNEs) in the European Commission (Commission) as the empirical laboratory. Using a variety of datasets, we unveil Commission SNEs' profiles (to assess their passive representativeness) and link these profiles to their role perceptions (to evaluate their potential for active representation). This illustrates that Commission SNEs' background characteristics do not match those of their constituent population (i.e. the EU27 population) -suggesting a lack of passive representativeness. However, we also find that their role perceptions are correlated with the policy preferences of their home country population: i.e., SNEs from countries favoring stronger national rather than European regulatory and policy-making powers are more likely to see themselves as a representative of their home country government. This suggests a potential for active representation in terms of SNEs' home country's policy preferences.
Introduction
Two key questions have repeatedly occupied political science scholars: Who governs, and does it matter who governs? Similarly, public administration scholarship has long been occupied with equivalent questions concerning non-elected office holders. The evolving literature on regulatory governance, by contrast, has attached comparatively less attention to who regulates and how it matters (e.g. Levi-Faur 2011 . With the increasing regulatory significance of international organizations (Biermann & Siebenhüner 2009; Costa & Jorgensen 2012 ) and the rising regulatory influence of international bureaucracies and transnational regulatory systems (Trondal et al. 2010; Abbott & Snidal 2013; Blauberger & Rittberger 2014), we arguably need to learn more about the representativeness of staff embedded in such international regulatory structures (Stevens 2009; Gravier 2008 Gravier , 2013 Ban 2013; Halliday et al. 2013) . Acknowledging that the main activity of the European Commission (Commission) is regulation, this study takes a novel step at addressing both questions among Commission office holders.
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Although such analysis would be of interest in its own right (Stevens 2009; Gravier 2008 Gravier , 2013 Ban 2013) , a key additional aim of this article lies in extending the literature on Representative Bureaucracy by offering the first large-N study of representativeness among seconded national bureaucratic staff in the Commission. Empirical studies on representative bureaucracy have thus far primarily addressed permanent office holders (e.g. Meier & Capers 2013; Kennedy 2014) . Our focus on seconded staff is inspired by the increasing presence of staff with ambiguous organizational affiliations in bureaucratic and regulatory structuresrecently referred to as a shift towards "contracted government" (Murdoch & Trondal 2013, p. 1 Choosing the Commission as empirical laboratory offers an opportunity to embed our analysis within an existing body of knowledge on Commission bureaucrats (Egeberg 2012a; Hooghe 2005 Hooghe , 2012 Gravier 2008 Gravier , 2013 Stevens 2009; Bauer 2012; Murdoch & Geys 2012; Ban 2013; Kassim et al. 2013) . Moreover, and more practically, Commission staff data are more easily publicly accessible than those of other international organizations.
1). This, in our view, requires a re-assessment of the legitimacy and governance implications inherent in staff representativeness (Halliday et al. 2013; Meier & Capers 2013; Riccucci et al. 2014) . On the one hand, the more flexible hiring procedures for seconding national staff into international organizations leave more room for manoeuvre in the hiring decision, which can affect the passive representativeness of the bureaucracy. On the other hand, seconded national government officials might feel less bound by the impartiality requirement implicit in (Weberian) bureaucratic decision-making than permanent office holders (Hammarsköld 1961; Cox 1969; Geuijen et al. 2008; Trondal et al. 2014) , which may raise concerns about their chosen mode of governance and their active or substantive representativeness (more details below). The latter is particularly relevant for international organizations since "what is at stake here is the very concept of an impartial ICS [i.e. International Civil Service], serving the [international organization's] member states in an independent way" (Mouritzen 1990, pp. 35-36; Weiss 1982; Ege & Bauer 2013) . From this perspective, the contributions of this article are two-fold.
First, we assess the demographic profile of seconded government officials, such as to assess their passive representativeness. Our analysis concentrates on Seconded National Experts (SNEs) working in the Commission. These constitute approximately 10% of the Commission's administrative staff with policy-making responsibilities, which makes them an important group within the workforce of the Commission. SNEs are particularly interesting from a theoretical perspective as they have an explicit policy-making role within the Commission. Such policy relevance is crucial where it concerns studies of Representative Bureaucracy (see also below). Moreover, SNEs are temporary staff members at the EU level, but at the same time they are permanent staff members of their national systems (where they remain formally employed and which continues to pay their salaries during secondment). This makes them of particular theoretical interest because they owe allegiance both to their home and host organizations. 2 The cross-pressures that arise from such duality imply that socialization from long-term embedment within the organizational structures may be absent from -or more difficult to establish for -such individuals, which makes them important for studies of bureaucratic representation (for a similar argument regarding street-level bureaucrats, see Thompson 1976; Meier 1993) . Indeed, one might expect them to serve their national masters (active representation) more than permanent Commission bureaucrats. As such, analysis of contracted staff's potential for active representation (as inferred from their role perceptions) provides an important, novel way to assess the conditions under which they might suffer from a (lack of) autonomy or independence while working in IOs. . These maintain that SNEs are obliged to behave solely in the interests of the Commission, and cannot accept any instructions or duties from their home government. However, they do not have the authority to represent the Commission externally on their own, or to enter into any commitments on behalf of the Commission. Compatible with the wishes of Jean Monnet when staffing the High Authority in 1952, SNEs' main role consists in providing the Commission with additional expertise, supplying learning across levels of government, securing the Commission a more flexible workforce hired through a fast-track recruitment system, and offering national governments with added experience. 3 The recruitment of SNEs is not subject to similar organizational safeguards as permanent Commission officials (the same holds for other types of contracted staff in the Commission, though the hiring rules for SNEs and contracted staff in the Commission are evidently not equivalent). SNE vacancies are usually publicized by the Commission at the Permanent Representation of members-states, which subsequently contact the respective national administrations. The recruiting Commission unit subsequently receives applications of SNE candidates from the member states, makes a shortlist and selects a candidate following a round of interviews (Suvarierol & Van den Berg 2008, pp. 106-107 ). Yet, deviations from this 'procedure' appear quite commone.g., with Member States taking the initiative and proposing seconded officials with particular knowledge (perceived to be) lacking in certain Commission units. To the best of our knowledge, no in-depth analysis exists of these various hiring 'procedures', nor their consequences. This remains an important avenue for further research.
beyond bureaucratic control (such as, for instance, citizen coproduction of public goods and services ; Whitaker 1980; De Witte & Geys 2011 , which limits their relevance in measuring active representation (Bradbury & Kellough 2007) . We thus study SNEs'
"potential for active representation (…) rather than seeking evidence of policy outcomes in line with the interests of specific groups" (Bradbury & Kellough 2007, p. 698) .
The data -which derive from official documents detailing the staff composition of the Commission, and a unique survey among Commission SNEs (N≈400) -reveal two new findings: First, Commission SNEs are not representative of their constituent population (i.e.
the EU27-population). 4 Although this may not be overly surprising in light of requirements that such officials have a certain level of education and expertise, the extent of this (un)representativeness varies substantially across policy areas within the Commission.
Second, while the role perceptions of Commission SNEs do not consistently differ depending on their socio-demographic characteristics, they do reflect at least in part the policy preferences of their home country. That is, SNEs from countries favoring stronger national rather than European policy-making powers are significantly more likely to see themselves as a representative of their home country government. This suggests a potential for active representation in terms of SNEs' home countries' policy preferences, and may undermine their independence or autonomy from member state interests (we return to this below).
In the next section, we briefly review the existing Representative Bureaucracy literature, and highlight the extensions to this literature in our analysis. Then, in section 3, we use a variety of datasets to unveil Commission SNEs' demographic and policy profiles (passive representation) and their role perceptions (active representation). Finally, section 4 concludes.
Theoretical backdrop
A key characteristic of ideal-type Weberian bureaucracies is that its bureaucrats follow "rules with regard to their office with dedication and integrity" and avoid "arbitrary action and action based on personal likes and dislikes" (Olsen 2006, p. 5; Weber 1978) . As such, personal background characteristics and policy preferences are assumed to be irrelevant for explaining staff behaviour. Clearly, as also recognized by Weber himself, such an ideal can at best be approximated in reality. This realisation is central to the theory of Representative Bureaucracy, which assumes that "if bureaucracy is broadly representative of the public it serves, then it is more likely to make decisions that benefit the public" (Meier et al. 1999 (Meier et al. , p. 1026 . Bureaucrats' background characteristics are thereby thought to matter in two ways:
First, the legitimacy of government agencies depends on the extent to which their staff composition reflects salient demographic characteristics of their constituencies (Meier & Capers 2013; Riccucci et al. 2014) . This reflects the normative viewpoint that "representation and staffing carries important implications for the delivery of public services [and] the sharing of power in society" (Schröter & von Maravić 2014, p. 6) . In line with such view, a more representative bureaucracy has been linked to improved overall administrative performance (Kingsley 2003) , increased worker loyalty and job satisfaction (Choi 2009 ) and higher legitimacy and accountability of the bureaucratic organization (Selden & Selden 2001) . From a more political perspective, bureaucratic representation can also play a symbolic role by suggesting equality of opportunities and equity (Groeneveld & van de Walle 2010; Gravier 2013; Peters et al. 2013) , and prove helpful during the implementation of controversial or unpopular (but necessary) policy programs (Pitts et al. 2010; Peters et al. 2013) .
Second, background characteristics of officials become particularly important when 'passive representation' leads to 'active representation'. Passive or descriptive representation thereby refers to shared characteristics along (usually socio-demographic) dimensions, whereas active or substantive representation refers to decision-making processes in the interest, or on behalf, of the represented (Meier 1975 (Meier , 1993 Riccucci & Saidel 1997; Kennedy 2014; Schröter & von Maravić 2014) . It is thereby important to highlight that active representation does not necessarily imply the existence of conscious decisions or actions representing the interest of a particular group over another. Rather, it is about acting in a way that favours the interests of a given group, whether this is done consciously or not. Both forms of representation -i.e. passive and active -need not necessarily occur jointly or be causally connected. Indeed, as already articulated by Pitkin (1967) and Mosher (1968) , it is not required that a bureaucracy is representative in a descriptive sense for it to take decisions that are representative in a substantive sense, or vice versa. Although recent work on
Representative Bureaucracy has often uncovered a link between passive and active representation (Hindera 1993; Meier 1993; Keiser et al. 2002; Atkins & Wilkins 2013) , such studies generally rely on aggregate-rather than individual-level data, "which limits the ability to draw inferences about the actions of individuals" (Riccucci et al. 2014, p. 13 ; see also Theobald & Haider-Markel 2008; Bradbury & Kellough 2011) . Nevertheless, such studies have been able to uncover, and illustrate the relative importance of, the direct and indirect mechanisms linking passive and active representation (Lim 2006; Meier & Nicholson-Crotty 2006) , and the role of threshold issues or 'tipping points' in such passive-active translation (Meier 1993; Keiser et al. 2002; Atkins & Wilkins 2013) .
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Yet, recent reviews indicate that the Representative Bureaucracy literature has thus far been predominantly concerned with permanent full-time street-or executive-level bureaucrats in national governments (Meier & Capers 2013; Kennedy 2014) . In our view, the increasing 5 Although it would be of significant theoretical interest to develop specific hypotheses about such 'tipping points' adapted to the multi-level, polycentric system of IO governance, we abstain from this here as our datasets do not allow testing such predictions empirically. That is, without direct insights into the role played by specific actors in particular decisions (about which we unfortunately lack data), we cannot assess how many officials from a given country with a given cultural identity and/or policy preference it would take to turn passive into active representation.
relevance of seconded national bureaucratic staff in international bureaucracies might well affect the overall representativeness of such bureaucracies. As indicated above, such influence can be expected in two dimensions. First, since the hiring procedures for seconded staff coming to the Commission are more flexible than those of permanent Commission staff, they might leave more room for manoeuvre in the hiring decision. This can make them an attractive instrument to bolster staff contingents that are under-represented in the permanent staff (e.g. women, minorities, disabled), and thereby improve passive or descriptive representation. However, the same flexibility can also be invoked to prioritize the filling of niche skill sets, which might carry unintentional or unrecognized adverse consequences for socio-demographic diversity. Hence, the overall effect on the passive representativeness of the bureaucracy is an important question that has not received empirical attention. Second, seconded government officials may raise concerns about how they actively represent the citizenry. For instance, national officials working in the Commission regularly invokes the fear that member-states strategically use such officials to their own advantage (Hammarsköld 1961; Cox 1969; Geuijen et al. 2008; Trondal et al. 2014) . The underlying apprehension is that seconded national staff may feel less bound by the impartiality requirement implicit in (Weberian) bureaucratic decision-making, or feel less loyal towards the institution to which they are temporarily assigned. Hence, simply studying who works as seconded officials (i.e. passive representation) is insufficient when evaluating their overall representativeness (thus including active representation).
The latter argument's inclusion of civil servants' active representation immediately raises an additional question. Most existing work on bureaucratic representativeness concentrates on socio-demographic characteristics such as race or gender (Meier & Capers 2013; Kennedy 2014 ). Yet, even when single civil servants play some role of "passive representation", this does not inversely mean that a bureaucracy should ever be fully representative in socio-demographic terms. Public officials are indeed required to have a certain level of education and expertise, and will thus be definition be unrepresentative in at least some respects. Moreover, it appears an ethical requirement for civil servants to serve the 'common good', which -in the absence of objective criteria to define the 'common' good -is generally viewed as being reflected in the preferences of the constituency's majority. As such, representativeness in socio-demographic terms would have to be complemented (though not replaced) with representativeness in terms of the policy opinions and preferences of the population at large.
Individuals are indeed likely to retain opinions and viewpoints from previous organizational environments in which they were embedded, and thus might be 'presocialized' towards certain behavioural perceptions before entering a new organization (Pfeffer 1982; Selden 1997 however, might be that individuals' policy preferences are not perfectly captured by their socio-demographic characteristics (Whistler & Ellickson 2010) . This is not to deny the importance of demographics and other social factors. In effect, it implies that policy preferences are likely to be driven by both organizational socialization and demographics and other social factors.
(…) rather than race, per se, or any other demographic characteristic, which appears to be the most important direct influence on administrator adoption of a (…) representative role". As one might contend that a truly representative bureaucracy reflects also the policy preferences -not just the socio-demographic characteristics -of its constituency (Rosset 2013) , this study goes beyond mere socio-demographics when evaluating staff representativeness.
Empirical analysis

Datasets
The analysis rests on a number of data sources. First, we collected information about the characteristics of the European population, since this is the most relevant comparison group for European-level bureaucrats (Gravier 2004 (Gravier , 2013 Stevens 2008 (which tend to have fewer SNEs). This similarity suggests that non-response within the targeted population was independent of the Directorate-General in which SNEs work. . These data could in principle be further aggregated using measures of variation or the Gini Index (which summarize a degree of inequality in one single number; for an overview of alternative measures, see Riccucci & Saidel 1997) . Still, as our prime interest lies in the relative incidence and frequencies of both groups (i.e. their proportionality), translating their diversity in one number of bureaucratic representativeness obscures much of the information we are interested in. Note also that while the first three socio-demographic characteristics are commonly included in Representative Bureaucracy studies (Kennedy 2014 ), the last characteristic (i.e. geographic origin) arguably becomes more important in international bureaucracies (Gravier 2008 (Gravier , 2013 . 
Passive representation
Commission administration ('Central'). The latter is interesting as it obtains confirmation when looking at the representation of women in permanent administrative policy-making posts across policy areas (details upon request). This may reflect the fact that the
Commission's credibility in requiring adherence to non-discriminatory gender hiring rules depends on the observance thereof in Central Directorate-Generals, which might play "the role of a kind of model employer" (Peters et al. 2013, p. 9) . Even so, despite a steadily increasing representation of women in administrative policy-making posts (Ban 2013 
total EU27 population). For SNEs, the sample depends on the Directorate-General cluster: N=379 (Commission); N=61 (Market); N=59 (External Relations); N=94 (Social Regulation); N=72 (Supply); N=23 (Provision); N=46 (Research); N=20 (Central). 'Market' is Directorate-Generals COMP, ECFIN, ENTR and MARKT; 'External Relations' is Directorate-Generals ELARG, DEVCO, FPI, ECHO and TRADE; 'Social Regulation' is Directorate-Generals CLIMA, EAC, EMPL, ENV, SANCO, HOME and JUST; 'Supply' is Directorate-Generals ENER, CNECT, MOVE, RTD and TAXUD; 'Provision' is Directorate-Generals AGRI, MARE and REGIO; 'Research' is Directorate-Generals ESTAT and JRC; 'Central' consists of BUDG, COMM, IAS, BEPA, SJ and OLAF. Translation and administrative services are excluded. (Directorate-General acronyms are explained in the appendix). Sources: Eurostat; European Commission (2011a, 2011b, 2011c); Authors' survey among Commission SNEs.
Thus far, we have only looked at bureaucratic representation in socio-demographic terms -as in the existing literature. Turning now to representativeness in terms of policy preferences, we introduce a number of measures of citizens' opinion towards the EU polity and its activities. The first is a general measure of Euroscepticism (see column 1 in table 3).
This reflects a general preference for less EU influence in public policy decisions, because it is likely to make citizens want to install accountability and control measures in order to avoid a 'run-away bureaucracy' in Brussels (Lubbers & Scheepers 2005; Serricchio et al. 2013 ). As such, it does not reflect preferences towards specific public policy programs, but rather indicates a preference concerning the level of decision-making (as an issue of sovereignty; i.e. the authority to adjust the content of a given policy). We measure Euroscepticism within the European population using the Eurobarometer question: "Generally speaking, do you think (your country's) membership is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad?". A country is defined as Eurosceptic if more than 20% of the population answers that EU membership is a bad thing. To avoid this measurement from being influenced by the recent economic recession, we use information from the last Eurobarometer before the onset of the on-going financial crisis (Eurobarometer 67.2 from 2007). This defines Austria, Finland, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom as Eurosceptic (which jointly cover 30% of the EU27 population; see table 3).
Evidently, this only provides a very general measure of popular preferences towards European-level public policy-making. As individuals' stance towards the EU may vary across policy areas, we extend the analysis (in columns 2 to 7 in table 3) using the following Eurobarometer survey question: "For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the national government, or made jointly within the European Union?".
Support for the first half of the statement (and thus in favour of national policy-making) receives value 1, while support for the latter half of the statement (and thus in favour of EU policy-making) receives value 2. The question is repeated for 18 policy areas (including 'fighting crime', 'taxation', 'defence and foreign affairs', 'health and social welfare', 'agriculture and fishery', and 'transports'), which can be matched to the seven DirectorateGeneral clusters differentiated in table 2. As such, we can calculate the share of a country's population that favours/opposes EU-level decision-making for each Directorate-General cluster (i.e. policy area). This allows us to define an indicator variable (i.e. NO-EU) equal to 1 if the share of a country's population opposing EU-level decision-making in a given policy area lies more than one standard deviation above the EU27 average in that policy area. 10 The results indicate Finland and the United Kingdom as opposing EU-level decision-making in all policy areas. To this 'core group', Sweden and Denmark are added for 'Market' Directorate- 10 We refrain from setting an absolute threshold here, as opposition to EU intervention is much higher in some policy areas (e.g. Social Regulation; over 65% of EU27 population) than others (e.g. External Relations; under 35% of EU27 population).
Generals (implying that, in total, NO-EU=1 for 19% of the EU27 population for this policy area), Sweden, Denmark and Austria for 'External Relations' (23% of the EU27 population), Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands for 'Social Regulation' (28% of the EU27 population), Austria for 'Supply' (18% of the EU27 population), Czech Republic, Austria and France for 'Provision' (31% of the EU27 population), and Denmark and Austria for 'Research' (20% of the EU27 population).
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To gain more insight into SNEs' representativeness in terms of preferences for/against EU decision-making within the EU27 population, table 3 reports the results from a comparison on this share of the EU27 population (row 1) and the share of SNEs within a
given Directorate-General cluster (row 2) that derive from countries that do not favour EUlevel decision-making in that particular policy area (as defined above). In Column 1, we look at general feelings of Euroscepticism, while the remaining columns analyse preferences specific to six of the seven Directorate-General clusters separated above (no data are available for 'Central' Directorate-Generals as their activities cannot be linked unambiguously to particular public policy programs). one hand, it might reflect that the Commission may avoid recruiting SNEs from countries opposed to EU-level policy-making in Directorate-Generals dealing with policies for which there is more opposition within the EU27 population (remember that opposition to EU intervention is much higher in Social Regulation than External Relations; see note 6). An alternative explanation could be that individuals deriving from countries with a more questioning position towards EU policy-making may be less interested in working for the Commission, or may face governments that are less willing to deprive themselves of skilled staff through the secondment system (especially where it concerns Directorate-Generals they consider as lacking legitimacy for these policy areas). Overall, however, the results in table 3 illustrate that the Commission might fall short of reflecting the policy preferences about (further) European integration within its constituency. 
Active representation?
Evidently, beyond the possibly symbolic role of representativeness (Groeneveld & Answers are coded using a six-point scale from 'fully' (coded as 0) to 'not at all' (coded as 5).
This question directly asks about role perceptions regarding the arguably most salient characteristic in our setting (i.e. nationality, or country of origin), and has therefore already attracted substantial attention in the literature studying socialization effects among permanent Commission staff (Hooghe 2005 (Hooghe , 2012 Trondal et al. 2010) as well as those officials' belief structures (Kassim et al. 2013) .
12 SNEs emphasizing national roles view European policymaking as an act of exchanging and balancing member-state interests. Adopting this role makes them more likely to defend national positions, and less likely to view Europe as an autonomous level of authority primarily designed to find policy solutions in the interests of a common European good. Exploring the extent to which Commission staff evokes 'European roles' thus also taps into the old neo-functionalist discussion on the conditions for loyalty transfer across government institutions (Haas 1958 ).
Our focus on role perceptions follows previous work by, among others, Selden (1997), Sowa & Selden (2003) and Bradbury & Kellough (2007) , and implies that we study the potential for active representation rather than actual realization thereof in policy decisions (Bradbury & Kellough 2007) . Although this diverges from the mainstream approach of measuring active representation through macro-level policy outputs or socio-economic outcomes, we believe that a focus on role perceptions is appropriate in our setting for two reasons. First, policy outcomes depend on numerous factors that lie beyond direct bureaucratic control (such as, for instance, citizen coproduction; Whitaker 1980; De Witte & Geys 2011 , which obscures a clear assessment of the (theoretically crucial) discretionary power of bureaucrats over final outcomes (Meier 1993; Sowa & Selden 2003; Bradbury & Kellough 2007) . This difficulty does not arise for officials' role perceptions, over which they have full control. Furthermore, previous scholarship has illustrated that "administrators who perceive their role as that of an advocate or representative of minority interests, are more likely to make decisions that benefit the minority community" (Selden 1997, p. 140) . Hence, role perceptions can be viewed as "a primary determinant of active representation" (Bradbury & Kellough 2007, p. 711; Selden et al. 1998) . Second, as mentioned above, active representation is about acting in a way that favors the interests of a particular group, whether this is done consciously or not. Therefore role perceptions can be a factor easing the way into active representation of particular groups' interests. Interpreted in this way, analysis of seconded staff's potential for active representation (as inferred from their role perceptions) provides a novel way to assess the degree to which national officials might come to suffer from a lack of autonomy or independence from member state interests while working in IOs (Hammarsköld 1961; Cox 1969; Geuijen et al. 2008; Trondal et al. 2014) .
The empirical analysis relies on the following regression model (with subscript i referring to SNEs).
In equation (1) First, on gender, studies suggest that female permanent officials in the Commission are more supranationally oriented than their male colleagues (Kassim et al. 2013, p. 111) , but it remains unclear whether this also holds for female temporary staff. Second, previous studies show no age effect with respect to permanent Commission officials' supranational orientation (Kassim et al. 2013) . Thus, the age variable is applied in this study without any clear prediction. Next, it may be expected that different fields of study make SNEs more or less oriented towards European vs. national concerns, because different disciplines are characterised by varying degrees of paradigmatic status and international orientation (Becher 1989; Braxton & Hargens 1996; Smeby 2000; Raadschelders 2013; Vukasovic 2013 (Kassim et al. 2013 ). The second, and arguably more interesting, observation is that the policy preferences of SNEs' home country population with respect to European decision-making powers in a given policy area do play a significant role in most estimations. Given the coding schedule of the dependent variables, we find that SNEs from countries favoring stronger national rather than This result initially appears at odds with recent work suggesting that SNEs in the Commission are "in practice likely to be relatively independent from member-state influence" (Trondal et al. 2014: abstract) . However, it should be remembered that we are investigating the potential for active representation, not its actual realization. From this perspective, it is interesting to observe that Trondal et al. (2014) highlight a number of conditions under which the independence of national civil servants in international bureaucracies might become compromised (such as the 'revolving door' hiring practices characterizing secondments).
Based on our analysis, deriving from an EU-sceptic country can be seen as one further relevant condition. That is, 
Conclusion
This study provides two main contributions. First, we extend the literature on Representative
Bureaucracy by being the first to analyse bureaucratic representation among seconded bureaucratic staff in international organizations. Such officials are making up a gradually increasing share of public policy-makers in international public organisations due to financial constraints. As this is likely to substantially affect the governance structure of such institutions, and will affect both passive and active representation among the overall body of public-sector officials, this evolution requires more attention in future RB research. Second, we introduce the importance of examining representativeness in terms of the constituent population's policy preferences in order to accurately assess the representativeness of a given bureaucracy. Both innovations taken together furthermore allow a novel way to assess the independence or autonomy of national officials working in IOs. The latter can be viewed as our main contribution to scholarship studying the increasing regulatory significance of international bureaucracies (Trondal et al. 2010 Finally, it is important to reiterate that 'perfect' passive representation seems untenable in light of requirements that public officials have a certain degree of education, and so on.
Moreover, as mentioned in the theoretical section, the passive representativeness of SNEs cannot be seen as independent of the (un)representativeness of the overall Commission staff.
That is, seconded positions may be used to bolster staff contingents that are under-represented in the permanent staff or may replicate existing Commission staff patterns (and thus increase its overall unrepresentativeness). As such, public officials are always likely to be unrepresentative at least to some extent. A more intuitively appealing benchmark may, therefore, arise through the comparison of the passive representative patterns of national and international bureaucracies. To the extent that we would observe major differences in the socio-demographic and policy representativeness of (inter)national bureaucratic staff, this would raise important questions regarding the nature and meaning of their relative representativeness. To the best of our knowledge, no such comparative studies exist in the RB literature to date.
13 13 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this interesting avenue for further research to us.
